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I.  Introduction 
In response to recent developments in the financial markets and the stunning 
growth of the hedge fund industry in the United States, policy makers, most notably the 
Securities and Exchange Commission (“SEC”), are turning their attention to the 
regulation, or lack thereof, of hedge funds.  U.S. regulators have scrutinized the hedge 
fund industry on several occasions in the recent past without imposing substantial 
regulatory constraints.  Will this time be any different? 
The focus of the regulators’ interest has shifted.  Traditionally, they approached 
the hedge fund industry by focusing on systemic risk to and integrity of the financial 
markets.
1  The current inquiry is almost exclusively driven by investor protection 
concerns.  What has changed?   
First, since 2000, new kinds of investors have poured capital into hedge funds in 
the United States, facilitated by the “retailization” of hedge funds through the 
development of funds of hedge funds and the dismal performance of the stock market.  
Second, in a post-Enron era, regulators and policy makers are increasingly sensitive to 
investor protection concerns. 
On May 14 and 15, 2003, the SEC held for the first time a public roundtable 
discussion on the single topic of hedge funds.  Among the investor protection concerns 
highlighted were:  an increase in incidents of fraud, inadequate suitability determinations 
by brokers who market hedge fund interests to individual investors, conflicts of interest 
of managers who manage mutual funds and hedge funds side-by-side, a lack of 
transparency that hinders investors from making informed investment decisions, layering 
of fees, and unbounded discretion by managers in pricing private hedge fund securities. 
                                                 
Marcia L. MacHarg is a partner of Debevoise & Plimpton, based in its Frankfurt, 
Germany office.  The author gratefully acknowledges the assistance of her 
colleagues, Lothar Kneifel and Monica Arora, in the preparation of this article.  
Debevoise & Plimpton reserves the right to use modified versions of this article in 
other publications or forms.  © 2003 Debevoise & Plimpton.  All rights reserved.  
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Although there has been discussion about imposing wide-ranging restrictions on 
hedge funds, such as reining in short selling, requiring disclosure of long/short positions 
and limiting leverage, such a response would be heavy-handed and probably unnecessary.  
The existing regulatory regime is largely adequate to address the most flagrant abuses. 
Moreover, as the hedge fund market further matures, it is likely that institutional 
investors will continue to weed out weak performers and mediocre or dishonest hedge 
fund managers. 
What is likely to emerge from the newest regulatory focus on investor protection 
is a measured response that would enhance the SEC’s enforcement and inspection 
authority, while leaving hedge funds’ inherent investment flexibility largely unfettered.  
A likely scenario, for example, might be a requirement that some, or possibly all, hedge 
fund sponsors register with the SEC as investment advisers.  Today, most are exempt 
from registration, although more and more are registering to provide advice to public 
hedge funds and attract institutions. Registration would make it easier for the SEC to 
ferret out potential fraudsters in advance by reviewing the professional history of hedge 
fund operators, allow the SEC to bring administrative proceedings against hedge fund 
advisers for statutory violations and give the agency access to books and records that it 
does not have today.  Other possible initiatives, including additional disclosure 
requirements for publicly offered hedge funds, are discussed below.  
This article addresses the question whether U.S. regulation of hedge funds is 
really taking a new direction.  It (i) provides a brief overview of the current U.S. 
regulatory scheme, from which hedge funds are generally exempt, (ii) describes recent 
events in the United States that have contributed to regulators’ anxiety, (iii) examines the 
investor protection rationale for hedge fund regulation and considers whether these 
concerns do, in fact, merit increased regulation of hedge funds at this time, and (iv) 
considers the likelihood and possible scope of a potential regulatory response, principally 
by the SEC. 
II.  The Hedge Fund Market 
Hedge funds have existed in the United States for more than 50 years as 
unregulated investment pools.  Typically structured as private limited partnerships or 
limited liability companies to provide flow-through tax treatment for investors, hedge 
funds have drawn scant regulatory attention.   
The primary reason for the latest regulatory offensive is the SEC’s belief that 
unsupervised and unregulated hedge fund managers pose a threat to the investing public 
as a result of “retailization” of the hedge fund market.  Hedge fund sponsors and broker-
dealers have exploited the present regulatory scheme to make hedge funds more broadly 
available to investors who would not otherwise have qualified to invest in such funds.   
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Recently, U.S. regulators have voiced this concern loudly, and the financial press has 
picked up the drumbeat.
2 
Another factor, some regulators have suggested, is that hedge funds are 
contributing to, or unfairly profiting from, falling stock markets.  The shroud of secrecy 
that generally surrounds hedge funds has exacerbated these concerns.  As expressed by 
Senator Richard Shelby, Chairman of the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and 
Urban Affairs:  “These investment pools have been, to borrow Winston Churchill’s 
words regarding Russia, ‘a riddle wrapped in a mystery inside an enigma.’”
3 
The term “hedge fund” is frequently used in the United States to identify a broad 
range of private investment vehicles that actively trade a variety of securities and 
commodities through a multitude of investment strategies, with an almost unbounded 
range of risk and return objectives.  These strategies include, among others, market 
neutral strategies, where managers aim to produce almost the same profit regardless of 
market circumstances (e.g., capitalizing on pricing inefficiencies with respect to 
particular securities or commodities or between related instruments while remaining 
neutral with respect to directional price movements in relevant markets) and event driven 
strategies (e.g., capitalizing on the price spread between the current market price and the 
value of a security upon successful completion of a merger and acquisition transaction).   
Hedge fund managers employ different techniques in pursuing these strategies, 
including:  arbitrage, where managers seek to exploit pricing anomalies of identical or 
similar financial instruments on different markets or in different forms (e.g., fixed income 
arbitrage, merger arbitrage, derivatives arbitrage); hedging through long/short
4 strategies, 
where managers invest in equity and/or fixed income instruments and combine long 
investments with short investments to reduce market exposure; and market timing, where 
managers attempt to predict the short-term movements of various markets and, based on 
those predictions, move capital from one asset class to another in order to secure market 
gains and avoid market losses.  These strategies and techniques involve the use of 
varying levels of leverage, that is, utilizing borrowed money in making investments.  
Because hedge fund managers generally can use these different strategies and techniques 
as they wish, the performance of a hedge fund may be considered less predictable than 
the performance of an investment vehicle, such as a mutual fund, managed according to 
stricter guidelines. There are other studies tending to demonstrate the capital preservation 
strengths of certain hedge fund strategies. 
Hedge funds have seen a marked rise in capital infusion since the start of the bear 
market in 2000.  It is estimated that currently there are close to 6,000 U.S. hedge funds 
controlling approximately $600 billion of total assets.
5  As the equity mutual fund 
markets lost their lustre, financial firms viewed hedge funds as vehicles to attract or 
retain affluent clients, as well as institutions, looking for diversification and alternative 
investments, and to retain talented portfolio managers who might benefit from the  
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incentive fees charged by hedge funds.  Some investors view hedge funds as a way to 
escape from, or at least balance, the dismal performance they have experienced recently 
with more traditional investments. 
The recent phenomenon of registered funds of hedge funds — in which an 
umbrella fund is registered under the Investment Company Act of 1940 (the “1940 Act”) 
and offered in a private placement to individual investors — has raised some regulators’ 
hackles.  Funds of hedge funds are indeed becoming more mainstream.  According to 
AdvisorBenchmarking.com, more than 15% of advisers allocated a portion of their 
client’s assets to funds of hedge funds, up from 4% in 2000.  It is estimated, however, 
that only about 60 U.S. hedge funds are registered investment companies.
6  These 1940 
Act funds theoretically are subject to a panoply of investor protection regulations, but the 
underlying hedge funds in which they invest are totally unregulated.  Such funds are 
proving to be a critical test of the underlying premises justifying hedge funds’ freedom 
from regulation.  The proponents of increased regulation argue essentially that investors 
in funds of hedge funds are precisely the investors who need regulatory protections, 
additional disclosure and more transparency. 
Several of these funds of hedge funds are also registered under the Securities Act 
of 1933 (the “1933 Act”) and are therefore not restricted to selling their securities only to 
sophisticated investors through private placements.  These 1933 Act registered funds of 
hedge funds are permitted to market to any investor; many require minimum investments 
of only $25,000.  In the summer of 2002, the first U.S. fund of hedge funds became 
eligible to sell its securities to the public. There are about 18 of such “public” funds 
currently in existence.
7  The staff of the SEC has expressed concern about the suitability 
of such funds for retail investors:  
While hedge funds have long been a product for wealthy investors, funds 
of hedge funds are now being made available to a broader investor base 
because the original investment is placed in a registered investment 
company.  These funds could thus pool smaller investors together to meet 
the high minimum investments [the underlying] hedge funds require.  
However, these types of funds are suitable only for certain investors given 
the nature of their investments.  We have been carefully scrutinizing these 
funds for appropriate disclosure and we are particularly interested in how 
these funds value their investments in the underlying hedge funds in 
determining their own net asset values.
8  
William Donaldson, recently confirmed Chairman of the SEC, announced in his 
confirmation hearings that he would encourage the continued investigation of hedge 
funds.  He stated his belief that “there is a tremendous growth in hedge funds, pretty 
much totally unregulated, a lot of money, a distressing move towards ‘retailization’ of 
hedge funds, and making them available to smaller and smaller investors and aggregating  
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their money.”
9  Donaldson also noted that the SEC’s Division of Investment Management 
had seen a “boom” in funds of hedge funds, all of which currently are subject to at least a 
$25,000 minimum investment.  Donaldson expressed concern, however, that there is no 
legal requirement to maintain a $25,000 minimum.  Funds could decide to lower the 
required investment, further compelling the SEC to focus on suitability issues and hedge 
fund marketing practices.
10  
III.  The Current Regulatory Scheme 
Hedge funds and other “private” pooled investment vehicles, and often their 
managers, generally seek to minimize the extent to which they are regulated in the United 
States.  They typically rely on exemptions from registration under the major U.S. 
securities and commodities laws applicable to pooled investment vehicles and their 
sponsors.  The following is a brief overview of the current regulatory regime and how 
hedge funds and their investment managers are presently exempt from regulation: 
A.  The 1940 Act 
The 1940 Act is the principal U.S. securities statute governing investment 
companies.  The 1940 Act regulates virtually every aspect of an investment company’s 
operations, including its governance and structure, leveraging by issuance of debt and 
other senior securities, investment and concentration limits, sales and redemptions of 
shares, and dealings with service providers and other affiliates.
11 
Private hedge funds, unlike regulated investment companies such as mutual funds, 
are exempt from 1940 Act restrictions on engaging in investment strategies such as 
leverage, short selling, or taking concentrated positions in a single industry, firm, or 
sector.  Further, hedge funds are not subject to valuation requirements applicable to 
registered investment companies, which must price their portfolio securities daily at 
market value or, if market values are not available, at fair market value.  
The exemptions under the federal securities laws including the 1940 Act for 
private funds, such as private hedge funds, are premised on one or both of two theories.  
First, investors in such funds are sufficiently sophisticated that they do not need all of the 
statutory protections.  Second, the private nature of the fund, the limited number of 
investors and, in certain cases, their “personal, familial and similar” ties suggest that 
federal oversight of the investment pool is impractical or unnecessary.
12   
These two theories are embodied in exceptions to the definition of “investment 
company” in the 1940 Act:  Section 3(c)(1) and Section 3(c)(7).  Section 3(c)(1) is 
available to an issuer whose outstanding securities (other than short-term paper) are 
beneficially owned by not more than 100 persons and that is not making and does not 
presently propose to make a public offering of its securities.    
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Section 3(c)(7) is available to an issuer whose outstanding securities are owned 
exclusively by persons who, at the time of acquisition of such securities, are “qualified 
purchasers,” and that is not making and does not at that time propose to make a public 
offering of such securities.  Qualified purchasers, for purposes of Section 3(c)(7), must 
meet a higher standard than that for “accredited investors” under the 1933 Act (see 
below), and generally include natural persons owning at least $5 million in investments 
and entities owning at least $25 million in investments.  It is important to note here that, 
in order for a fund to rely on either the 3(c)(1) or 3(c)(7) exception, the fund’s securities 
must be sold in a “private placement” under the 1933 Act. 
Section 3(c)(1) was amended to reflect the current fewer than 100 beneficial 
owner exception, and Section 3(c)(7) was added to the 1940 Act recently, pursuant to the 
National Securities Markets Improvement Act of 1996 (“NSMIA”).
13  Prior to the 
enactment of NSMIA, private investment pools such as hedge funds were limited to 
fewer than 100 investors.  The SEC considered this limitation to be arbitrarily restrictive 
in size and unresponsive to a perceived increase in investor financial sophistication about 
private fund investment.
14  Accordingly, the new Section 3(c)(7) exception was adopted.  
The recent launch of funds of hedge funds was facilitated by these mid-1990s 
developments and subsequent SEC rulemaking.   
Regulators have expressed concern that the recent trend toward the fund of hedge 
funds structure amounts to exploitation of a regulatory loophole under the 1940 Act.  
Investors in funds of hedge funds, by pooling their capital, can invest indirectly in the 
very hedge funds in which they would be unable to invest directly.  For example, a 
registered fund that invests in an underlying 3(c)(7) hedge fund meets the “qualified 
purchaser” requirements for the underlying fund.  A registered fund that invests in an 
underlying 3(c)(1) hedge fund will have pooled a sufficient amount of assets from its 
various investors to invest a significant amount in the 3(c)(1) fund.
15  In reality, an 
individual investing in a fund of hedge funds could not invest directly in a 3(c)(1) hedge 
fund because such a fund, limited to fewer than 100 investors, would probably be unable 
to attract a critical mass of capital from individuals.  Similarly, most investors in a fund 
of hedge funds could not invest directly in a 3(c)(7) fund, as to which each investor must 
meet the “qualified purchaser” investor standard, a much higher standard than the 
“accredited investor” standard (see III.B. below). 
B.  The 1933 Act 
The essential purpose of the 1933 Act is to protect investors; it is concerned 
primarily with the initial distribution of securities, rather than subsequent trading.
16  This 
is achieved by requiring registration with the SEC and dissemination of certain 
information concerning the securities before they are publicly offered for sale.  
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Most private funds, including hedge funds, rely on the private placement 
exemption in Section 4(2) of the 1933 Act to avoid registering their securities under that 
Act.  Section 4(2) exempts “transactions by an issuer not involving any public offering” 
from the 1933 Act’s registration provisions.  The basic thrust of Section 4(2)’s 
interpretative history is that the statutory exemption from registration is available in 
situations where the 1933 Act’s protection is not needed because the potential investors 
can “fend for themselves.” 
Regulation D under the 1933 Act provides a means of establishing that an issuer 
is not making a public offering for purposes of Section 4(2).  Most hedge funds rely on 
Rule 506 under Regulation D to meet the “no public offering” exemption.  Under this 
rule, no public offering is deemed to have taken place if the issuer has not engaged in a 
general solicitation of its securities and if securities are offered to no more than 35 non-
accredited investors.  The rule permits offering to an unlimited number of “accredited 
investors,” which include, among others, most financial institutions, any natural person 
who, individually or together with such person’s spouse, has at the time of purchase of 
securities a net worth in excess of $1,000,000, and any natural person who during the 
preceding two years had, and reasonably expects in the current year to have, an individual 
income exceeding $200,000 or, together with such person’s spouse, $300,000. 
At the conclusion of the SEC roundtable, SEC officials signaled that they would 
be considering increasing these thresholds, which have not changed since Regulation D 
was adopted in 1982, to discourage less sophisticated investors from putting money into 
complex hedge fund vehicles.  It is worth noting that regulators, wary of the retailization 
of hedge funds, are most troubled by the handful of funds of hedge funds that have 
registered under the 1933 Act and are thus publicly available.  Investors in these vehicles 
are not legally required to meet even the “accredited investor” standard under the 1933 
Act. 
Hedge funds that rely on an exemption from registration under the 1933 Act 
remain fully subject to the antifraud provisions in Section 17(a)
17 and the regulations 
thereunder. 
C.  The 1934 Act 
While the 1933 Act regulates primarily the initial distribution of securities, the 
Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (the “1934 Act”) governs subsequent trading, serving 
four main purposes:  (i) to afford a measure of disclosure to people who buy and sell 
securities; (ii) to prevent, and afford remedies for, fraud in securities trading and 
manipulation of the markets; (iii) to regulate the securities markets; and (iv) to control the 
amount of credit that goes into those markets.
18  
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Among other things, the 1934 Act empowers the SEC to require registration and 
periodic reporting of information by issuers of publicly traded securities.  Section 12(g) 
of the 1934 Act requires an issuer having 500 or more holders of a class of equity 
securities and more than $10,000,000 in assets to register the class of equity securities.
19  
Under Rule 12h-3 of the 1934 Act, an issuer with over $10,000,000 in assets, that would 
otherwise be subject to the reporting requirements required by Section 15(d) of the 1934 
Act, is exempt from providing reports if its securities are held of record by fewer than 
500 persons.
20  Hedge funds generally seek to limit the number of record owners of their 
securities to fewer than 500 persons in order to avoid becoming subject to these 
registration and reporting requirements. 
As with the 1933 Act, even if a hedge fund can rely on an exemption under the 
1934 Act, the antifraud provisions of Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 under the 1934 Act 
still apply to these funds.
21  
D.  The Advisers Act 
The Investment Advisers Act of 1940 (the “Advisers Act”) requires investment 
advisers with at least $25 million in assets under management, as well as investment 
advisers of any registered investment companies, including 1940 Act registered hedge 
funds, to register with the SEC.  Registered investment advisers must comply with 
significant substantive regulations, including extensive books and records requirements 
and disclosure through the Form ADV.  Additionally, registered investment advisers are 
limited in their ability to charge performance-based fees of the kind often utilized in the 
hedge fund industry. 
Most sponsors or investment advisers of hedge funds rely on the exemption from 
registration under Section 203(b)(3) of the Advisers Act.  Section 203(b)(3) exempts 
from registration any adviser that during the course of the preceding 12 months has had 
fewer than 15 clients and that does not hold itself out generally to the public as an adviser 
or act as an adviser to a fund registered under the 1940 Act.  Under Rule 203(b)(3)-1 
promulgated by the SEC, a limited partnership (such as a hedge fund) generally is a 
single client of any general partner or other person acting as an investment adviser to the 
partnership.  An adviser may count a limited partnership as a single client as long as the 
adviser provides advice based on the partnership’s investment objectives, and not the 
individual objectives of the limited partners.  An investment adviser that has its principal 
office and place of business outside the United States must count only clients that are 
U.S. residents; an investment adviser that has its principal office and place of business in 
the United States must count all clients. 
The SEC staff has historically interpreted the “holding out to the public” element 
of Section 203(b)(3) broadly to include, for example, using letterhead or business cards 
that refer to advisory activities and maintaining a publicly accessible website that  
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provides information about advisory services.  The SEC staff has, however, allowed an 
adviser that posts hedge fund information on a website to rely on Section 203(b)(3) where 
access to the website was limited to certain accredited investors.
22 
Under Advisers Act Rule 205-3, registered investment advisers may charge 
performance-based fees (carried interest) without significant constraints only to 
“qualified clients,” as defined in that Rule.  Qualified clients include: (i) persons with at 
least $750,000 under management with the adviser; (ii) persons with a net worth 
(together with spouse) of more than $1.5 million; (iii) “qualified purchasers” as defined 
under the 1940 Act; and (iv) executive officers, directors or general partners of the 
adviser or employees who participate in the adviser’s investment activities.  Accordingly, 
investment advisers to registered hedge funds, in order to take advantage of the special 
performance fee exceptions under Rule 205-3, require investors to meet these standards. 
Similar to the other U.S. federal securities laws, the Advisers Act contains an 
antifraud provision (Section 206) that is applicable to all investment advisers, whether or 
not registered.
23 
E.  The Commodity Exchange Act 
Hedge funds that trade in futures, options on futures, or commodities options are 
deemed “commodity pools” for purposes of the Commodity Exchange Act (“CEA”) and 
are subject to regulation by the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (the “CFTC”).  
Hedge funds whose interests are offered exclusively to “qualified eligible participants” 
(“QEPs”) may qualify under CFTC Rule 4.7 as “exempt pools.”  The definition of QEP is 
quite flexible and includes most institutional investors that are subject to other regulatory 
schemes (i.e. banks, insurance companies, ERISA plans) as well as investment 
professionals, knowledgeable employees, qualified purchasers under the 1940 Act (see 
above in III.A.), non-U.S. persons, and accredited investors under Regulation D who 
have securities portfolios of at least $2 million.  The commodity pool operator (“CPO”) 
and commodity trading adviser (“CTA”) (see below) of a hedge fund that is sold in a 
non-public offering under Section 4(2) of the 1933 Act and that qualifies as an exempt 
pool under CFTC Rule 4.7 is subject to reduced reporting, recordkeeping, and disclosure 
requirements with respect to such hedge fund.  
In November 2002, the CFTC published an Advance Notice of Proposed 
Rulemaking (“ANPR”)
24 intended to facilitate investments in commodities by operators 
of collective investment vehicles.  The ANPR proposed to exempt from CPO registration 
commodity pool operators that commit a limited amount of pool assets (i.e. not more than 
5% of liquidation value) to establish commodity interest trading positions, that do not 
market participations in the pool to the public, and that restrict pool participation to 
“accredited investors,” as defined in Regulation D under the 1933 Act.  Pool operators 
would be required to file a notice of exemption with the CFTC before relying on the  
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proposed rule.  In the ANPR, the CFTC also proposed to exempt from CPO registration 
pool operators that operate pools exempt from registration under the 1933 Act and that 
restrict participation to, in the case of individual investors, QEPs, and in the case of 
entities, “accredited investors” as defined in Regulation D
25 or QEPs.  Certain other 
requirements would also apply, including that the CPO would be required to file a notice 
of eligibility with the CFTC.  In the ANPR, the CFTC issued no-action relief pursuant to 
which it will not pursue enforcement action during the rulemaking process against a CPO 
for failure to register where each pool for which the CPO claims relief meets certain 
criteria consistent with the rule proposals.  A CPO must file a claim with the CFTC and 
the National Futures Association (“NFA”) in order to rely on the no-action relief. 
The adviser to a hedge fund is generally a CTA for purposes of the CEA and, 
absent an available exemption, must register as such with the CFTC.  In the November 
2002 ANPR, the CFTC also proposed to exempt from CTA registration those persons 
that provide advice only to pools operated by persons that are eligible for, and have 
claimed exemption under, the proposed CPO exemption described above, and whose 
commodity trading advice is solely incidental to the business of providing advice to such 
pools in instruments not subject to CFTC regulation.  Persons claiming such exemption 
would not be permitted to hold themselves out as CTAs, and would be required to file a 
notice of exemption with the CFTC.  The ANPR also included no-action relief for CTAs 
if they comply with certain criteria consistent with the proposed rule and file a claim with 
the CFTC and NFA in order to rely on the no-action relief.  
F.  Anti-Money Laundering Regulation 
Hedge funds must be aware of U.S. anti-money laundering (“AML”) regulation.  
In October 2001, the USA PATRIOT Act
26 made significant changes to the Bank Secrecy 
Act (the “BSA”), the major U.S. civil statute on money laundering.  On September 18, 
2002, the U.S. Department of the Treasury (“Treasury”) proposed a new rule under the 
BSA, which would establish the minimum requirements for AML programs for certain 
unregistered investment companies, including hedge funds, commodity pools and real 
estate funds.
27  A hedge fund will be subject to the proposed rules if it (i) gives investors 
a right to redeem their ownership interests within two years after purchase and (ii) has 
total assets of at least $1,000,000 at the end of the most recent calendar quarter.  An 
offshore hedge fund meeting these criteria will be subject to the rule if it (i) sells 
ownership interests to a U.S. person or (ii) is organized, operated or sponsored by a U.S. 
person (e.g., a fund sponsor or manager located in the United States).
28  Although it is 
unclear when and in what form this rule will be adopted, hedge funds will have to comply 
with the final rule 90 days after it is published in the Federal Register. 
Under the proposed rule, a hedge fund’s AML program has to be reasonably 
designed to prevent the fund from being used for money laundering or the financing of 
terrorist activities and to achieve and monitor compliance with the applicable provisions  
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of the BSA.  The program must:  (i) establish and implement policies, procedures and 
internal controls reasonably designed to achieve these objectives; (ii) provide for 
independent testing for compliance; (iii) designate one or more persons responsible for 
implementing and monitoring the AML program; and (iv) provide for ongoing AML 
training for appropriate persons.  The proposed rule also would require a hedge fund to 
file a notice with Treasury’s Financial Crimes Enforcement Network, including contact 
information for the fund, its sponsors, and its AML compliance officer, the amount of the 
fund’s assets under management, and the number of fund security holders.  Treasury 
further encouraged hedge funds to adopt procedures for voluntarily filing reports relating 
to suspected money laundering.    
In addition, Section 356(a) of the USA PATRIOT Act mandated that Treasury, 
the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, and the SEC submit a joint report 
to Congress with recommendations for effective AML regulation of investment 
companies, including hedge funds.  The December 31, 2002 report to Congress (“Joint 
Report”) noted that hedge funds may be the most susceptible type of unregistered 
investment companies open to abuse by money launderers because of the relative 
liquidity of their interests and their structure.  It stated that “[t]he potential availability of 
‘anonymous’ investment and the inability of law enforcement to obtain information about 
the beneficial ownership of corporate entities in certain jurisdictions make this type of 
hedge fund particularly attractive to money launderers.”  Regulators made two 
recommendations for AML regulation of hedge funds:  hedge funds should (i) establish 
AML programs and (ii) implement customer identification and verification programs 
(“CIPs”).
29 
Treasury has not yet issued proposed rules outlining its recommendations for 
CIPs for hedge funds, but the requirements might bear some resemblance to the final 
rules on CIPs that Treasury has issued for mutual funds and registered broker-dealers.  In 
its broadest outlines, a CIP requires that a financial institution implement procedures to 
verify the identity of any person or entity seeking to open an account, to the extent 
reasonable and practicable, including making a determination as to whether the potential 
customer appears on any lists of known or suspected terrorists or terrorist organizations 
provided to the financial institution by any government agency, and to maintain records 
of the information used to verify the identity of such person or entity.  
G.  Consumer Privacy Regulations 
The Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act of 1999 (the “GLB Act”) required the SEC and 
other federal agencies to adopt regulations restricting the ability of financial institutions, 
including hedge funds, to disclose an individual’s nonpublic personal financial 
information to non-affiliated third parties.  
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Registered investment advisers are required to comply with the SEC’s Regulation 
S-P (Privacy of Consumer Financial Information).  Hedge fund sponsors and other 
advisers that are not registered with the SEC are subject to the privacy regulations 
promulgated by the Federal Trade Commission (the “FTC”) under the GLB Act, which 
are substantially similar to Regulation S-P. 
Both the SEC’s and the FTC’s privacy schemes generally require that a sponsor 
and hedge fund notify their “consumers” and “customers” (as defined in the regulations) 
of their policies and practices regarding nonpublic personal information.  If the sponsor 
or hedge fund intends to share nonpublic personal information about consumers and 
customers with certain non-affiliated third parties, the customers must be permitted to opt 
out of such information sharing.  Permitted disclosure of nonpublic personal information 
to third parties is limited, and safeguards must be adopted to maintain the security of 
customer information.  Importantly, these requirements apply only to individuals (as 
opposed to entities such as trusts or pension plans) who are consumers or customers of 
the sponsor or the hedge fund.  The schemes also include a number of important 
exceptions to the notice, information sharing, and opt out provisions (e.g., to permit 
information sharing with service providers and to protect against fraud). 
H.  State Regulation 
Under NSMIA, states are preempted from regulating securities offering or 
investment advisers that are subject to registration under, or exempt from registration by, 
the federal securities laws.  Thus, hedge funds and their sponsors are generally free from 
regulation under state law.  States may, however, require notice filings by hedge funds 
and their sponsors and may also collect fees.   
Although state regulators are preempted from much regulation in the hedge fund 
area, one area in which they retain authority is in broker-dealer regulation.  Brokers may 
be required to make certain filings before offering hedge funds in a state, and states can 
act to protect consumers from “unsuitable” investments.  Importantly, state regulators 
could effectively make it impossible for certain hedge funds to be marketed in a state if 
they determined that such investments were “unsuitable” for investors in that state.  
Certain activities (such as acting as adviser to both a private and public fund and 
funneling opportunities between them in an inappropriate manner) could also trigger 
state-law antifraud provisions.  In a recent speech to the Wall Street Hedge Fund Forum, 
New York Attorney General Eliot Spitzer expressed his belief that, although the hedge 
fund industry did not require fundamental change, the use of leverage and other 
techniques should be examined.
30   
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IV.  Yesterday’s Regulatory Mantra:  Systemic Risk 
A.  Prelude to the Prelude 
The first hedge fund is thought to date to 1949.
31  In 1968, the SEC conducted a 
survey reporting 140 hedge funds operating at that time.
32  Regulatory interest in hedge 
funds increased for the first time in the recent past following the market break of October 
1987 when the Dow Jones Industrial Average declined by nearly one-third.  In response 
to the market break, President Reagan created the Task Force on Market Mechanisms 
(“Task Force”) to determine what happened and to provide guidance to prevent it from 
happening again.  The Task Force was specifically commissioned to examine the current 
and long-term financial condition of the U.S. securities markets; identify problems that 
threaten the short-term liquidity or long- term solvency of such markets; analyze potential 
solutions to such problems that would both assure the continued smooth functioning of 
free, fair, and competitive securities markets and maintain investor confidence in such 
markets; and provide appropriate recommendations.
33   
The Task Force determined that the market break was triggered by a number of 
events, including an initial decline in the market that stimulated the aggressive selling by 
hedge funds in anticipation of further market declines, which, in turn, set off further 
selling in the market.  Rather than propose specific regulation for hedge funds, the Task 
Force focused on the need for the different market segments (e.g., stocks, stock index 
futures, options) to act as one market.  Its recommendation included that clearing systems 
and margin regulations be made consistent across marketplaces to reduce financial risk 
and control speculation and financial leverage.  Traditional hedge fund activities were, of 
course, captured in these recommendations. 
Congress proposed legislation to implement many of the Task Force’s 
recommendations and eventually the Market Reform Act of 1990
34 was enacted into law.  
The Market Reform Act of 1990 amended the 1934 Act and authorized additional power 
for the SEC in emergency situations, established reporting and disclosure requirements 
for market participants, and directed the SEC to facilitate the establishment of a national 
system for clearance and settlement of securities transactions.  
B.  Long-Term Capital Management 
The next major incident in the hedge fund industry, and corresponding regulatory 
focus, occurred almost ten years after the recommendations issued by the Task Force, 
with the near collapse of Long Term Capital Management (“LTCM”).
35   LTCM, 
founded in early 1994, operated a hedge fund (the “LTCM Fund”) led by a team of 
highly respected and experienced individuals, including two Nobel laureates.  LTCM 
sought to profit from a number of trading strategies, including convergence trades
36 and 
dynamic hedging.
37  At the end of 1997, LTCM had a capital base of $4.8 billion.   
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However, by leveraging its investments, it controlled significantly larger positions. By 
August 1998, it held over $125 billion of assets.   
In a well-documented fiasco, the LTCM Fund ran into a significant problem 
following Russia’s devaluation of the ruble in 1998 and other market events.  During 
August and September 1998, the LTCM Fund suffered substantial losses and encountered 
major liquidity pressure.  A number of major banks and other financial institutions that 
were trading counterparties and lenders to LTCM would have been exposed to an LTCM 
default.  The actual number and identity of participants in the liquidity chain could not be 
determined.  Fourteen financial services firms agreed to participate in a consortium to 
recapitalize LCTM, which had the effect of providing these firms with a 90% equity 
stake in LTCM’s portfolio and operational control of the LTCM Fund.  The Federal 
Reserve Bank of New York provided the facilities for these discussions and encouraged 
the firms to “seek the least disruptive solution that they believed was in their own 
collective self interest.” 
In the wake of the LTCM incident, hedge fund practices were closely examined 
by regulators and received much attention from the press.  President Clinton 
commissioned The President’s Working Group on Financial Markets (“PWG”), 
comprised of representatives of the Department of the Treasury, the Board of Governors 
of the Federal Reserve System, the SEC, and the CFTC.  The PWG conducted a study 
that explored the policy implications of the LTCM incident, culminating in a report 
entitled, “Hedge Funds, Leverage, and the Lessons of Long-Term Capital Management” 
(the “PWG Report”).  The PWG Report included the following recommendations: (i) 
more frequent and meaningful information on hedge funds should be made public; (ii) 
public companies should publicly disclose additional information about their material 
financial exposures to significantly leveraged institutions; (iii) financial institutions 
should enhance their practices for counterparty risk management; (iv) regulators should 
encourage improvements in the risk-management systems of regulated entities and take 
other actions to promote risk management by regulated entities; and (v) regulators should 
consider stronger incentives to encourage non-U.S. financial centers to comply with 
international standards. 
The PWG’s concerns, like those of the Task Force ten years earlier, were related 
to investor confidence in and operations of the markets rather than investor protection.  
The PWG Report focused on systemic risks in the market, including the implications of 
the use of leverage and “determining the proper balance between the benefit that leverage 
confers to markets and the potential systemic risk posed by high levels of leverage.”  
Significantly, the PWG Report expressly dismissed the notion that hedge funds raised 
significant investor protection issues that warranted changes to the various securities laws 
exemptions that hedge funds rely upon:  
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Although hedge funds may present certain risks, these vehicles generally 
have not been associated with traditional investor protection issues (such 
as self-dealing by the fund’s manger).  Investors in private funds typically 
receive disclosure concerning the risks presented by these funds.  The 
antifraud provisions of the [securities laws] also apply to the sale of a 
private fund’s securities, whether or not the private fund is registered 
under the Investment Company Act.
38 
In addition, the PWG Report observed that modifying the exemptions under the 
federal securities laws to address the perceived risks presented by hedge funds could be 
overreaching because such an approach “may also impose unwarranted burdens on other 
types of private investment pools . . . that may not raise the same concerns as hedge 
funds.”
39   
C.  Proposed Legislation 
In response to the LTCM incident and the PWG Report, public disclosure-based 
legislative initiatives were introduced – including the “Hedge Fund Disclosure Act” 
(H.R. 2924).  This legislation, if enacted, would have required unregulated hedge funds to 
submit quarterly reports for public dissemination to the Board of Governors of the 
Federal Reserve System, including:  (i) total assets and notional amount of derivatives 
position; (ii) the balance sheet leverage ratio of assets to liabilities; (iii) meaningful, 
comprehensive measures of market risk; and (iv) such other information as selected 
regulatory agencies required.  Only those unregulated hedge funds with capital of $3 
billion or more, or total net assets of at least $1 billion would have been subject to the 
proposed regulation.  It is interesting to note that, while this initiative would have 
severely impeded the freedom of certain large hedge funds, the majority of hedge funds 
would not have been captured by the proposed regime because their assets failed to meet 
the proposed thresholds.  Conversely, many other private funds would have been swept 
in. 
Other disclosure-based initiatives surfaced as well.  In November 1999, the 
“Derivatives Market Reform Act of 1999” (H.R. 3483) was introduced in the House of 
Representatives.  This legislation proposed to amend the 1940 Act to require unregistered 
hedge funds to submit quarterly status reports to the SEC, including a statement of the 
financial condition of the fund, income or losses, cash flows, changes in equity, and a 
description of the models and methodologies used to calculate, assess, and evaluate 
market risks.   
These legislative initiatives were never enacted.  The principal responses to the 
LTCM incident appeared in the regulatory and private arenas – enhanced focus on risk 
management and assessments of counterparty risks.
40  Perhaps because most hedge fund 
investors have traditionally been institutions, legislation or regulatory initiatives to  
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further limit the sale of hedge funds to certain investors were not proposed.  Importantly, 
the legislative proposals that followed the LTCM incident focused on disclosure issues 
that would have permitted better monitoring by regulators and market participants, but 
may not have resulted in meaningful disclosure to investors. 
V.  Today’s Regulatory Mantra:  Investor Protection 
A.  The SEC Fact-Finding Investigation 
As discussed above, the SEC’s recent discomfort with hedge funds is a direct 
result of the growth in the number of hedge funds, total assets under management, and 
seemingly increased accessibility for individual investors, together with its lack of 
understanding of the industry.  Because hedge funds are typically not registered with the 
SEC, they are not directly subject to examination and inspection by the SEC, and the 
SEC is thus “limited in [its] ability to detect problems before they result in harm to 
investors or the securities markets”
41 (emphasis added).  This lack of oversight ability, 
coupled with a perceived boom in the retailization of hedge funds, was the driving force 
behind the SEC’s formal fact-finding investigation announced in May 2002. 
Beginning in 2001, in a series of speeches, senior members of the SEC staff 
suggested that hedge funds raised investor protection issues.  Interestingly, these 
speeches appear to have coincided with the first registrations of funds of hedge funds.  In 
one speech, Paul Roye, Director of the SEC’s Division of Investment Management, 
remarked: 
If one needs a reason to appreciate the regulatory framework governing 
the mutual fund industry, you need only look to the recent miniboom we 
have experienced in hedge fund fraud. The SEC has brought a number of 
cases this past year exposing schemes that siphoned hundreds of millions 
of dollars from investors in these largely unregulated funds. Some have 
mistakenly concluded that hedge funds are beyond our reach, because they 
are not subject to registration or reporting requirements. Nonetheless, 
hedge funds are subject to the antifraud provisions of the federal securities 
laws. While it is difficult to prevent those otherwise intent on engaging in 
fraudulent activity from doing so, I submit that the regulatory framework 
governing the mutual fund industry makes such types of fraud more 
difficult to commit and easier to detect.
42 
Based on these and similar statements by the SEC staff, the SEC is taking a proactive 
approach to address its investor protection concerns with respect to the hedge fund 
market, rather than reactively as it did in response to the market break in 1987 and the 
near collapse of LTCM.  In May 2002, then-SEC Chairman Harvey Pitt explicitly raised 
the issue of hedge fund regulation:  
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By all accounts, private investment funds have experienced a seismic 
boom in both number and total assets under management.  But, since these 
entities are not subject to reporting requirements, the information we have 
about them is sketchy.  We are concerned about the implications flowing 
from the growth in these private investment funds.  Accordingly, we will 
seek a better understanding of the issues currently affecting these vehicles 
by commencing a formal fact-finding investigation to enlighten us about: 
•  incidents of fraud that we have seen with certain of these vehicles, 
particularly hedge funds; 
•  conflicts associated with managing these vehicles alongside mutual 
funds; and 
•  marketing these vehicles directly and indirectly to retail investors. 
Our goal is to determine whether the present state of regulation – or 
perhaps more accurately the lack thereof – is in the public interest.
43 
Shortly after Chairman Pitt’s remarks, the SEC issued a formal order of 
investigation authorizing a fact-finding inquiry into hedge funds and other private funds.  
The actual order has not been made public; there has, however, been a substantial amount 
of publicity concerning the inquiry, including an article on The New York Times editorial 
page.
44    
The SEC investigation began in the summer of 2002.  The SEC staff conducted a 
number of meetings with private fund professionals, focusing on the following areas: 
(i) services (prime brokerage, advisory, capital introduction, etc.); (ii) marketing to obtain 
business; (iii) counterparty credit risks (margin, collateral, risk limits); (iv) market risks 
from hedge fund investments and lending; (v) selling and recommending hedge funds to 
investors; and (vi) guaranteed or other alternative products. 
In addition, the SEC’s Office of Compliance Inspections and Examinations 
conducted inspections of registered and unregistered private fund sponsors.  The SEC 
staff requested a number of documents and information with respect to each fund, 
including, among other things, the following: (i) the means by which the sponsor 
identifies or solicits investors, including the methods used to pay for these 
introduction/referral services and lists of third-party consultants (and the services 
provided by the consultants); (ii) fund performance information (including a description 
of the methodology used in calculating performance); (iii) a description of the processes 
relied upon by the funds to make suitability determinations for sale of interests to 
investors; (iv) information concerning private fund brokerage and related arrangements; 
(v) a description of the valuation process used by each fund; (vi) the use of websites to  
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disseminate information concerning the fund; (vii) information concerning independent 
audits of the fund; and (viii) copies of offering memoranda and other marketing 
information and reports provided to investors and prospective investors. 
B.  Scrutiny of Broker-Dealers and Their Hedge Fund Activities 
The SEC is also interested in the activities of broker-dealers that are involved in 
the businesses and services related to hedge funds.  The SEC has conducted examinations 
of such broker-dealers, and has considered their arrangements with hedge funds from 
both a financial risk perspective, as counterparties to broker-dealers, and from an investor 
protection perspective, as products sold by broker-dealers to investors.
45 
The SEC is particularly examining the practice of “capital introduction services” 
by prime brokers, which clear and finance trades on behalf of a customer.  These services 
are aimed at bringing hedge fund managers together with potential investors.  At the 
roundtable, Chairman Donaldson indicated the SEC is looking into these services, 
including the manner in which they are disclosed to investors. 
The SEC staff has concluded that as a result of “the downturn in the stock market, 
and reduced broker-dealer revenues from traditional activities – M&A business, 
investment banking, trading, commissions, and others – some firms seem to be 
competing heavily in new areas, including for hedge fund business.  In this environment, 
there is concern that firms could take greater credit or market risks or market aggressively 
to investors.”
46  
C.  Role of the National Association of Securities Dealers 
Like the SEC, the National Association of Securities Dealers, Inc. (the “NASD”), 
the self-regulatory organization for broker-dealers, is hindered from detecting hedge-fund 
fraud early because most hedge fund sponsors are not brokers registered with the NASD.  
The NASD has therefore traditionally focused on registered broker-dealers that sell hedge 
funds to their clients.   
Citing the surge in the popularity of hedge funds, in February 2003, the NASD 
issued a Notice to Members expressing concern that members that sell interests in hedge 
funds and funds of hedge funds may not be complying with sales practices requirements 
with respect to such sales.
47  The NASD is especially concerned about sales of hedge 
funds to retail investors, and has instructed members to consider the “desirability and 
suitability” of hedge funds for such investors in light of the fact that hedge fund investing 
has traditionally been available only to high net worth individuals and institutions.   
In the Notice to Members, the NASD reminded its members that their sales 
practice obligations with respect to hedge fund and fund of hedge fund sales include:  (i) 
providing balanced disclosure in promotional efforts; (ii) performing a reasonable-basis  
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suitability determination as to the hedge fund product; (iii) performing a customer-
specific suitability determination; (iv) supervising associated persons selling hedge funds 
and funds of hedge funds; and (v) training associated persons regarding the features, 
risks, and suitability of hedge funds.
48 
It can be expected that the NASD will use its authority to regulate broker-dealers 
to refine further its sales practice and suitability guidelines in the hedge fund area and 
bring additional enforcement proceedings where warranted. 
D.  Enforcement Activity 
Cases of hedge fund fraud have probably contributed the most to regulators’ 
investor protection concerns.  In a speech in April 2002, a month before the 
announcement of the SEC investigation, the Director of the Division of Investment 
Management stated: “Hedge fund managers always must keep in mind that, even though 
they consider themselves to be ‘unregulated,’ they have a fiduciary duty to their clients.  
The [Securities and Exchange] Commission and others are watching to make sure that 
hedge fund managers meet their fiduciary obligations.”
49 
There have been a number of enforcement actions since the beginning of 2001 
that involve hedge funds and other private funds.
50  Many of them involve allegations of 
garden-variety fraud (i.e. misappropriations of funds, Ponzi schemes, misleading 
performance claims).
51  The SEC recently charged Beacon Hill Asset Management, a $1 
billion fund, with fraud and reportedly is currently investigating the demise of Lipper 
Convertible Funds.  The agency is also reportedly exploring the short-selling practices of 
several smaller hedge funds, including Gotham Partners, Greenlight Capital, Aquamarine 
Fund, and Tilson Capital Partners.
52  In the case of Gotham Partners, the firm 
unexpectedly closed its biggest funds after a disastrous real-estate investment.  
Regulators are said to be examining complaints that the firm, which analyzed stocks on 
its own website, may have colluded with other firms to manipulate stock prices. 
Most enforcement cases have involved registered investment advisers; however, 
as noted above, the antifraud provisions of the Advisers Act on which these actions are 
based apply to all investment advisers, whether or not registered with the SEC.  Most 
recently, cases have been brought for portfolio pumping, the departure from investment 
objectives, failure to obtain best execution, and breach of fiduciary duty.
53  Because 
hedge funds are subject to the antifraud provisions of the federal securities laws under the 
existing regulatory regime, it is fair to question whether further regulation would provide 
the SEC with useful enforcement tools that it does not already have. 
Similar to actions brought by the SEC, in April 2003 the NASD brought its first 
enforcement action since it began its focus on hedge funds.  The agency censured and 
levied a $175,000 fine against Altegris Investment, a California firm accused of  
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marketing hedge funds to small investors while exaggerating the funds’ prospects and 
without fully declaring their risks.  The NASD also fined the firm’s chief compliance 
officer $20,000 for failing to adequately supervise the firm’s hedge-fund advertising 
practices.
54 
E.  Current Legislative Focus 
Perhaps prompted by renewed regulatory interest, hedge fund issues are once 
again on the legislative agenda.  The U.S. House of Representatives Financial Services 
Committee announced in February 2003 that it will monitor the SEC’s review of hedge 
fund regulation, consider the impact on U.S. markets if the hedge fund business moves 
offshore, and look into investors’ access to hedge funds and the risk disclosure that 
investors receive.
55  In March, the Committee announced its intention of holding a series 
of hearings on the role that hedge funds play in the financial markets.   
Last month, the Senate Committee on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs held a 
hearing on recent developments in hedge funds.  SEC Chairman Donaldson was the sole 
witness at the hearing.  The committee’s main concerns that prompted the hearing were:  
(i) the potential that a very large, very leveraged hedge fund could blow up much like 
LTCM, creating systemic market risk; (ii) the retailization of hedge funds and the 
layering of fees in the fund of hedge funds structure; and (iii) conflicts of interest that 
arise when hedge funds are managed alongside mutual funds.   
It remains to be seen whether this renewed interest by Congress will result in new 
proposed legislation. 
F.  The SEC’s Hedge Fund Roundtable 
The SEC’s formal fact-finding investigation culminated in two days of public 
roundtable discussions on May 14 and 15, 2003.  The roundtable discussions by a wide 
range of panelists, including fund managers, service providers, attorneys, accountants, 
investor advocates, and foreign and U.S. regulators, covered a number of topics 
including:  (i) the structure, operation and compliance activities of hedge funds; (ii) 
marketing issues; (iii) investor protection issues; (iv) the current regulatory scheme; and 
(v) whether additional regulation is warranted. 
The discussions focused mainly on the investor protection concerns discussed 
throughout this article.  One prominent theme was the policy implication of funds of 
hedge funds for the U.S. retail market.  Opinions varied greatly and the SEC’s view on 
whether or not to further regulate accessibility to hedge funds by the retail market 
remains unclear.  Other focal points included (i) the dated accredited investor standard in 
Regulation D, (ii) the current net-worth requirement as an appropriate proxy for financial 
sophistication, (iii) the registration of hedge fund sponsors as investment advisers, and  
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(iv) the general institutionalization of hedge fund sponsors and hedge fund investors.  The 
panelists were generally supporters of hedge funds and accessibility.  The SEC made 
clear that it valued the role of hedge funds in the U.S. market.  The SEC will publish its 
research and recommendations on the hedge fund market before the end of the year. 
VI.  What’s Next? 
It is difficult to assess whether and to what extent policy makers will seek to 
impose additional regulation on private funds, including hedge funds.  In a recent 
hearing, Senator Paul Sarbanes stated: “We may have to close the door on some of those 
exceptions or exclusions, or redefine them in such a way to accomplish what needs to be 
accomplished but [cannot be] utilized or manipulated for other purposes that endanger the 
stability of our markets.”
56  On the other hand, SEC Chairman Donaldson, although 
anxious to examine hedge funds, may not be ready to seek immediate regulation of their 
operations:  “It’s hard to make a universal rule about how to run a hedge fund because 
you’d defeat the purpose of having a hedge fund.”
57 
Certainly, the SEC inquiry, including the discussion and the public report that will 
be issued, perhaps before the end of this year, will be the primary force shaping future 
regulation, if any. 
A.  Is There a Need for New Regulation? 
There is a strong argument that further regulation is entirely unnecessary.  The 
current concerns relating to hedge funds appear to be based more on incidents of fraud 
and the potential for increased fraud due to rapid growth and retailization of the industry 
rather than the potential for broader market dislocations (either from hedge fund trading 
activities or credit risks to major participants in the financial system).  The antifraud 
provisions of the federal securities laws have provided the SEC with ample grounds to 
pursue private fund managers through enforcement actions, such as in instances where 
the fund managers fail to abide by the disclosures made in the offering memorandum.
58  
The counter-argument is that the SEC could do more and be proactive rather than reactive 
if it had some authority to regulate market participants, principally advisers to hedge 
funds. 
Arguably, additional disclosure requirements are unnecessary as well.  
Traditionally, most opponents of detailed disclosure obligations proceeded on the 
proposition that wealthy and sophisticated investors could demand enough disclosure to 
protect themselves.  The competition among hedge funds has been considered enough of 
a motivating force for hedge funds to strike the right balance between protecting 
proprietary strategies and disclosing information to investors.  These factors are 
undermined by the demonstrated retailization of the hedge fund market, the development  
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of registered funds of hedge funds and the relatively complex nature of some kinds of 
hedge fund strategies. 
Regulators can also protect investors by other means, for example, through 
education.  On February 12, 2003, the SEC issued an alert (such alerts are issued 
infrequently) on its website warning investors of the special hazards involved with 
investing in hedge funds and funds of hedge funds.
59  In connection with this warning, 
the SEC launched a number of bogus websites to advertise fictitious hedge funds, 
including GRDI Select L.P.
 60 (“greedy”), to warn investors of fraudulent hedge funds. 
State regulators currently have the authority to severely restrict registered hedge 
fund sales through their regulation of brokers. 
Finally, the institutional market will force out weak funds and managers.  As the 
hedge fund industry matures, managers will have to respond to investor demands for 
transparency and risk disclosure in order to remain competitive.
61   
B.  Where Regulation Is Unlikely 
The regulatory approaches vented at last week’s roundtable ran the gamut from 
laissez faire to heavy-handed.  Several avenues will be duly considered and rejected by 
the SEC. 
It is unlikely that fundamental hedge fund investment strategies will be subject to 
significant regulation.  As discussed throughout this article, regulators and legislators 
have visited this issue repeatedly in the past, and have chosen to keep hedge funds free 
from such regulation.  However, hedge fund strategies, including leverage and short 
selling, will not be free from scrutiny, particularly in the context of registered hedge 
funds.  For example, Eliot Spitzer, the New York Attorney General famous for the recent 
landmark investigation of conflicts of interest in the investment banking industry, 
announced that although “hedge funds do not demand structural change,” he believes that 
leverage and the manner in which illiquid securities are priced do require examination.
62 
Although the SEC might consider restrictions on certain types of short selling 
(such as where short-sellers have not borrowed stock to cover the shorts) or the shorting 
of less liquid stocks, it is unlikely to require the disclosure of individual short positions.  
Such disclosure requirements would allow competitors to take offsetting positions that 
would negatively affect a hedge fund.  As in the United Kingdom, where the Financial 
Services Authority (the “FSA”) has pronounced shorting to be a “legitimate investment 
activity,” short selling itself is not considered a menace to the marketplace.
63  However, 
on the issue of potential manipulation through short selling, Chairman Donaldson 
announced that “the [SEC] will consider amendments to existing short sale regulation, as  
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necessary, to curb potential manipulation by all market participants, including hedge 
funds, without unnecessarily restricting liquidity.”
64 
Finally, there do not appear to be any efforts to impose a public disclosure 
obligation similar to those proposed following the LTCM blowup in the late 1990s.  
Notwithstanding recent news reports suggesting increased pressure for hedge fund 
disclosure based on market protection theories,
65 it is clear that any broad-based 
disclosure initiatives are likely to face regulators’ skepticism, and vigorous opposition 
from the industry.  The ability to shield investment decisions from other investors plays a 
large role in a hedge fund’s strategy.  If hedge fund managers were required to disclose 
publicly specific information regarding their strategies, they would risk third parties 
being able to use that information to the hedge fund’s detriment.  For example, an 
investor who knows that a hedge fund holds a large short position in a specific security 
could use that information to negatively affect the hedge fund by trading against the short 
position. 
At the roundtable, the SEC staff did indicate that it would at least be examining 
related disclosure issues, including whether hedge fund performance calculations should 
be standardized.  The SEC staff also appeared particularly concerned about the type of 
disclosure that investors in registered funds of hedge funds receive with respect to 
underlying funds, and the SEC examination staff’s lack of access to information 
concerning the underlying unregistered funds. 
C.  Where Regulators Might Tread 
Regulation through reporting requirements, monitoring of sales practices, or other 
amendments to the federal securities laws is possible.  Changes to the basic private fund 
exemptions under the 1940 Act would require legislation.  In enacting the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act of 2002,
66 Congress has shown that it is capable of acting quickly on 
legislation in the face of a series of major scandals.  Although there is no legislation 
pending that would alter the 1940 Act exemptions, the possibility of legislation cannot be 
ruled out. 
Requiring hedge fund sponsors to register under the Advisers Act may be the 
most logical response to regulators’ recent discomfort with hedge fund independence.  As 
a registered investment adviser, a hedge fund sponsor would be subject to routine 
examinations by the SEC, perhaps easing concerns of undetected fraud.  Subjecting fund 
sponsors to registration under the Advisers Act could bring:  (i) a restriction on the types 
of retail investors who could be charged performance fees, (ii) the SEC ability to audit 
funds periodically, and (iii) limitations on certain investment techniques, such as 
leverage, employed by a hedge fund.  The SEC can bring administrative proceedings, 
subpoena witnesses and documents, and issue cease and desist orders with respect to 
registered investment advisers.    
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Members of the staff of the SEC have suggested informally that the most 
seamless manner in which hedge fund sponsors would be subject to regulation under the 
Advisers Act would be to modify the basis for determining whether a sponsor can rely on 
the Section 203(b)(3)
67 registration exemption by, for example, counting each investor in 
a fund (instead of the fund itself) as a client.  For example, under the SEC’s present rules, 
an adviser to a hedge fund with 120 investors is deemed to have one client (the hedge 
fund).  Under a proposed rule change, the adviser would have 120 clients (each investor 
in the hedge fund) and would therefore no longer qualify for the fewer than 15 client 
exemption from registration.  This type of change, which would result in the registration 
of hedge fund sponsors, could be done by the SEC through rulemaking and would not 
require legislation.   
Indeed, as noted at the roundtable, the United States is one of the few countries 
that does not require hedge fund sponsors to register.  In the United Kingdom, where 
hedge fund sponsors are required to register in with the FSA, such regulation has not had 
a discernible adverse impact on the UK hedge fund industry.  The SEC would, however, 
have to consider any unintended consequences of counting each investor, instead of the 
hedge fund itself, as a client.  For example, would each investor then also be considered a 
client for purposes of making suitability determinations with respect to each fund 
investment?   In addition, such measures would likely prompt challenges by other private 
fund sponsors. 
Another initiative that has been proposed to increase investor protection is to 
revise the definition of “accredited investor” under the 1933 Act.  Some advocates of 
tighter regulation have suggested that the bar to qualify as an accredited investor should 
be raised to reflect the economic trends and increased wealth accumulation of the last few 
decades.  The SEC could accomplish this change by amending its own Regulation D.  
Industry trade groups such as the Association for Investment Management and Research 
strongly support the examination of what they have stated may be “obsolete” and “static 
regulatory yardsticks” for determining investor sophistication.
68  At the April 10 Senate 
hearing, Chairman Donaldson reflected on this point: “Although the [SEC] is not aware 
of any systemic investor losses or other failures caused by the current accredited investor 
standards, we could of course consider adjusting it, if appropriate.”
69  
VII.  Conclusion:  Is U.S. Regulation Really Taking a New Direction? 
After all has been said and done and the SEC issues its report on hedge funds, 
some regulatory changes are probably inevitable. 
Many would argue that a key assumption underlying the current clamor for tighter 
regulation of the hedge fund industry – the emergence of a wave of unsophisticated retail 
investors – is wrong, and that the growth in the industry is actually being driven by 
institutional investors.  Recent data seem to support this view.
70  If this is the case, we  
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must ask, what has really caused the sudden surge in regulatory interest in hedge funds?  
The growing popularity of hedge funds is certainly a result of the bear market, and 
perhaps the increased scrutiny by regulators is also a result of the bear market.  
Regulators may have a psychological need to amplify the risk of retailization in order to 
play an active role in avoiding what they may perceive to be a potential financial disaster 
for many individual investors who may not have fully understood the risks involved in 
hedge fund investment. 
There are signs that the SEC’s interest in investor protection is not limited to 
protecting retail investors.  In a 2001 speech, a senior SEC staff member discussed the 
increasing level of public pension plan investment in hedge funds and suggested that the 
risks in investing in hedge funds affect institutional investors as well: 
[I]t is harder for hedge fund investors to know how their funds are being 
managed, much less exert control over the manager.  Managers can 
change investment strategies and their investors would never know.  
Moreover, it is more difficult for hedge fund investors to vote with their 
feet. Many hedge funds only allow investors to cash in their holdings on a 
few days a year.  All of this can make it easier for a hedge fund manager 
to engage in fraud.  . . . Clearly, the flow of billions of dollars into hedge 
funds creates opportunities for legitimate fund managers, but also for 
Ponzi scheme operators and swindlers.
71 
In the end, perhaps U.S. regulators will conclude that the principled basis for 
additional regulation will be to provide additional enforcement and inspection tools 
needed to forestall fraudulent practices in the industry, reset the bar for accredited 
investors eligible to invest in private placements, and encourage or mandate responsible 
hedge fund market participants to provide better disclosure about underlying funds and 
valuations to all investors.  
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